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PRESENTATION BY JOHN A. ODOZYNSKI, ESQ.
MR. ODOZYNSKI: Good afternoon. It's good to be here. I am
sure we are all impressed by the level of thought that went into the
presentations earlier today. My focus is a little more mundane.
As a corporate counsel, I am primarily engaged in monitoring the
behavior of my clients and of competitors and providing advice in that
area. Of course, the last thing clients want to hear is thinking that is
going to impede their behavior. So consequently, I would like to focus
on what Feist said about, and what we think it means to, copyrightability determinations in the future; both copyrightability and copyright infringement.
As we all know, Feist, having discarded sweat of the brow as a
rationale to support copyright, depending upon the point of view you
want, established a new criteria for copyrightability, or better defined
the prevailing copyrightability criteria. In any event, what we are left
with is a standard of copyrightability for compilations that requires
originality in the selection, arrangement, or coordination of the compilation. We are also told that originality now requires not only the fact
that the compilation is not copied, but a modicum of creativity.
Feist, however, does not inform us about the character of the creativity that is required; and you are probably aware of the various levels
one can think of creativity in: the old originality standard, that is, not
copied; this higher level of creativity, novelty standard-that is, new;
and perhaps a non-obviousness standard that we are familiar with in
patent law. I think we will see over time, some patent-like notions
creeping into copyright law.
Because the Court found that Rural's white page listings did not
meet even the minimum level required, it was not required to confront
a copyright infringement issue in this litigation. But somewhat surprisingly, we think that Feist has, or may have, or can be expected to have
some effect on the way copyright infringements determinations are
made.
Part of this involves the element of creativity. The Feist analysis of
the copyright infringement takes on a new mode. Part of this is because, prior to Feist, courts adopting sweat of the brow, or endorsing a
sweat of the brow rationale uniformly found the work before them uncopyrightable and had little difficulty in finding that the accused work,
in fact, represented an infringement. On the other hand, courts who did
not embrace sweat of the brow, but relied on something more elaborate
or elevated for copyrightability, were prone to strike down the
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copyrightability of the work in question and never reached the issue of
infringement.
As a variation on that, what we now hear, and we have present in
Feist itself, is the notion that some works by their very nature only
afford thin copyright protection (whatever that means). So the character of the work itself will, without much analysis, determine the scope
of copyright protection afforded to it. I think that is perhaps an unfortunate way to approach the analysis.
It is my view that what always was required, and remains required
after Feist, is a determination of what precisely about the work in
question is copyrightable and the comparison of the work in hand with
the accused's work to determine whether there is substantial similarity-as determined by our copyright laws, between the accused work
and the copyrighted work. Having said that, and again reinforcing the
notion that Feist itself probably did not significantly change the standard of copyrightability-and I think many of the cases that have been
handed down in the months since March reinforce that-it remains
necessary to get a handle on copyrightability because as I have indicated, it is impossible, in my view, to determine the scope of protection
in a given copyright without assessing what, in fact, is copyrightable
about the work in hand. So again as I said, probably the majority of
the compilation cases, at least those coming down since Feist, have
gone the same way they might have gone in the absence of Feist, or, at
a minimum, have upheld copyrightability.
There are a couple of cases that I think are useful to explore to see
how Feist might operate at the margins. One of those is Victor Lalli v.
Big Red Apple. The question in Victor Lalli involved a work, that in
essence was a chart, comprising a compilation of numbers generated by
what I would refer to as algorithms. The algorithm was simply the total dollars of two-dollar bets to win, place, and show at a local race
track in the New York metropolitan area.
The way the numbers on the charts were generated was simply to
take the sums of the two-dollar bets on all nine races, then take a number that represented the sums for the first three races, then a second
number that represented the sum for the first five races, and then a
third number that represented the sum for the first seven races, then
take the last digit of those three sums and generate a three digit number. Those numbers then constituted an element of a chart. The chart
had a number for each of the days of a relevant month. In spite of
what I would have to perceive as at least a modicum or minimum level
of creativity in the creation of those numbers, the Second Circuit held,
without much discussion, that the compilation in question was merely a
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/15
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compilation of preexisting facts and upheld the district court's holding
of uncopyrightability.
So the questions, at least two questions, presented by Victor Lalli
are these: How is it, given the exercise in the algorithm that I have just
described, that the results of that algorithm can be deemed to be preexisting facts when, in reality, those facts did not exist, and probably
never would have except for the implementation by Victor Lalli of the
algorithm? Leaving that question aside, there is a more difficult question: Given the algorithm, which we may agree was creative in some
aspects-the simple arithmetic or mechanical acts of computing arithmetic sums based on a creative algorithm can be considered a creative
process-the question remains: Do the mechanical operations in implementing that algorithm impart copyrightability to the result when, in
fact, the algorithm itself might be an idea, process, or a method and
not protected by copyright law? These questions are unanswered, and
in fact, unaddressed by the court.
The second case, also a nondescript infringement case coming
down after Feist, was Sem-Torq v. K mart. What was involved in SemTorq was a set of five double-sided signs, and I will confess that on my
first reading of Sem-Torq, I pretty much summarily dismissed it and
did not recognize that there was something copyrightable there. What I
would suggest we do is apply Feist's standards of minimal creativity to
Sem-Torq and see what we get as an output. In Sem-Torq the court
admitted that no one had ever compiled a set of signs either identical
or substantially similar to Sem-Torq's signs. Nevertheless, the court
could not recognize any copyrightability or any creativity in that compilation. The court summarily said that the set is no greater than the
sum of its parts; in fact, I suppose you can say, ignoring the essence of
all copyright.
We see, even in Feist, and in other opinions dealing with
copyrightability of compilations, the notion that what we have is a set
of preexisting elements, preexisting facts, and that the collection of
those facts can be no greater than the sum of the individual facts themselves. However, the fact is that the very essence of the compilation is
to identify, or recognize, individual items of data with respect to which
there are mutual correlations. Essentially, information is created by virtue of the fact that the selection did not exist before.: And it is the
creation of information that I submit ought to be protectible under the
copyright compilation law.
In any event, the Sixth Circuit in Sem-Torq pretty much summarily, without much discussion, held the Sem-Torq signs to be not copyrightable. In fact, you can glean from that opinion the notion that the
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compiling those signs. What I submit is the work here is something of a
reverse sweat of the brow notion according to which, the court, perceiving not much effort in compiling the signs and really not doing much in
the way of creativity analysis, simply struck down copyrightability. I
would argue that if sweat of the brow is not an applicable doctrine, is
not to be used to determine the copyrightability, it symmetrically ought
not be used to strike down copyrightability.
So we are left, in my belief, with a creativity standard that in spite
of Victor Lalli, has really not been, to me, demonstrably affected by
Feist. But, again, we need to consider copyrightability in determining
the scope of the copyright, so I would like to move to that area.
In my view, the way I think about copyright infringement issues is
to determine, or the way I like to see them analyzed, is to determine
what the scope of copyright protection in the copyrighted work is, and
compare the accused work with the protectible elements of the copyrighted work to determine whether there is a substantial similarity. In
effect, what I think that breaks down to after Feist, is a threshold determination of whether the purported copyrighted work, in fact, satisfies the criteria of originality, that is, creativity and origination with the
author.
The second element of the copyrightability determination, in my
view, is the application of idea/expression merger analysis to a work
that you may have agreed to have at least complied with or satisfied
the initial criteria. Of course, the way merger analysis operates is to
draw a line between what is idea and what is expression in the work
and then apply the merger doctrine to what is left of the scope of the
copyright work in question.
Feist tells us, with respect to scope of copyright protection, that
only the selection and arrangement are protectible. Raw facts may be
copied at will. And this result is neither unfair nor unfortunate.
Against that backdrop we would like to determine, I would feel it is
necessary to determine, what the scope of copyright protection is in any
compilation.
A case decided pre-Feist may give an indication, in my view, of
the way the courts have to slide over this analysis and give short shrift
to what represents the copyrightable component of a work. I am referring to Worth v. Selchow & Righter, and I think many of you are
familiar with this case.
Worth, of course, involved the game Trivial Pursuit. The copyright
owner, Worth, had compiled an encyclopedia of some twelve thousand
entries, each of the entries consisting of the statement of a particular
fact. Now we .are not told exactly how Mr. Worth compiled his encyclopedia, but we can assume, I think, that these were facts that he
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/15
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thought were interesting to himself or that he expected would be interesting to readers of his encyclopedia. Selchow & Righter, in the effort
to develop their game Trivial Pursuit, copied four thousand of Worth's
facts. The Fifth Circuit in Worth simply held that in order to constitute
infringement, the entire selection of facts in the game Trivial Pursuit
would have to have been identical to Worth's encyclopedia. The fact
that Selchow & Righter had taken four thousand of the twelve thousand was not sufficient.
I think, speaking for myself, that pretty much flies in the face of
what I would consider to be an applicable notion of substantial similarity, the taking four thousand of twelve thousand-thirty or thirty-five
percent of any given work should have constituted an infringement-but the court in this case held that in order for infringement to
have occurred, what would have been required is a taking of the entire
selection of Worth's work.
We see this notion coming up in some more recently decided cases,
including Kregos and Key Publications,where the court indicated that
what really was required in order to constitute infringement of a compilation is the taking of the entire compilation. I do not have a reason
why that standard would apply; I have a suggestion that I will offer
you in a minute.
The second case I would like to discuss in the scope of copyright
protection vein is the case of Bellsouth v. Donnelly. Just when things
were looking bad for the publishers of telephone directories, Bellsouth
comes down, and, in fact, I suppose turns the whole thing on its head.
In Bellsouth, the Eleventh Circuif held the directory in question tobe copyrightable as a result of an original selection, arrangement, and
coordination. The selection engaged in by Bellsouth was the selection of
geographic areas, the geographic boundaries of any telephone directory, the close date after which they would include no additional listings in the directory, and the selection of the business classifications
that constituted the yellow pages of the directory. I am sure you are all
familiar with those. The creative arrangement was, in fact, taking the
listings that they had collected from their business customers or from
.their advertising customers and assigning them to one of the roughly
two hundred categories in the directory.
Donnelly's copying occured in three parts: the keying of data from
a given Bellsouth directory into a computer; preparation of sales lead
sheets based on that data; and, the subsequent publishing of a directory
that was substantially identical to Bellsouth's directory. So, although
what we have here again is an activity on the part of the accused infringer-two activities, the keying of the data into the database and the
of the sales
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bore little similarity to Bellsouth's copyrighted work-and we have the
court, in fact, here finding at least the requisite or appropriate scope of
the protection and the substantial similarity to have been sufficient to
uphold the finding of infringement.
The questions presented in Bellsouth, in my mind, are primarily
these. The Eleventh Circuit in Bellsouth pretty much assumed, without
much discussion, that the categories of business classifications selected
by Bellsouth were original. And I think, as we are all aware when we
take a look at a yellow pages directory, although it would be difficult to
probably find two directories that are identical, there is a high degree
of commonality between the business classifications included in any directory, with maybe some minor modification-rin the way the classifications in fact are articulated. However, there is a core area of commonality that I would submit is traceable from one directory to another.
The Eleventh Circuit, for whatever reason, did not explore this factor
and simply held that those categories were copyrightable. I think what
would have been required was a closer look into the categories used by
Bellsouth in their directory in comparison with what was existing in
other directories. What I am looking for here would be a degree of
similarity between Bellsouth's categories and categories in other directories. The similarity in my mind would be relevant evidence to establish that either Bellsouth's directory was not copyrightable because it
was not creative, that is, it did not vary in any significant degree from
other directories, or that the substantial similarity between Bellsouth's
directories and other directories might be an indication that those clas•sifications had not originated with Bellsouth, but were either copied or
derived from classifications that existed fairly pervasively through the
industry.
If the court had gone that route and examined Bellsouth's directory classification scheme to determine what in that scheme was original to Bellsouth, that is, creative, the court would have been required to
compare Donnelly's classification scheme to Bellsouth's. Presumably,
the court would have looked for some similarity or substantial similarity between the aspects of Bellsouth's directory that are copyrightable
and similar aspects in Donnelly's. Of course, that did not occur.
Let us talk a little bit about the idea/expression merger because,
as I said earlier, it is my view that the scope of c6pyright protection in
compilations, as in any other work, is determined by how the idea/
expression line is drawn and what effect, if any, the merger doctrine
has to play in that. I think a recent case that highlights that reasonably
well is Kregos v. The Associated Press. As you may be aware, the
Kregos' compilation consisted of the selection of pitching statistics, nine
that were used to predict the outcome of that day's baseball games.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/15
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In Kregos, the Second Circuit held that no previous compiler of
statistics of this sort had used the same statistics that Kregos had used.
Although the district court had found Kregos' compilation to be noncopyrightable, the fact that, assuming only twenty possible statistics
could be used to create a compilation of Kregos' original collection of
statistical items, nine represents one of one hundred sixty-seven thousand ways of combining nine out of twenty. The fact that no one else
had done it, according to the Second Circuit, was clearly evidence of
originality.
The problem was in articulating what the idea of Kregos' work
was in order that the merger doctrine might be applied. There was a
dispute as to what the appropriate idea of Kregos' work was. The contending ideas were simply a compilation that would predict the outcome of baseball games. The contending idea submitted by and urged
by the dissent was a compilation of pitching statistics that would provide the most useful predictor of the outcome of the baseball game.
So what we have here, the difficulty we often perceive in courts, is
idea/expression line drawing and the dispute between the majority and
dissent as to what was the appropriate line of demarcation. Of course,
the majority prevailed after holding that, with respect to these kinds of
compilations, there was a continuum spanning matters of pure taste,
for example, to matters of predictive analysis. Although Kregos' compilation in this case clearly had some predictive purposes, to define the
idea of his work as precisely as the dissent would suggest would be to
deprive it of all copyright protection whatsoever, because defining that
precisely would require the idea to merge with the expression.
There are a couple other issues that were raised by the dissent in
Kregos in the context of idea/expression merger analysis which might
be useful to discuss.
There were, in fact, three strains of merger, idea/expression
merger, that can be identified in Kregos and were urged by the dissent.
The first is the one that I have already addressed - the notion that if
there is one or only a limited number of ways to express an idea, then
that idea will be deemed to be a merger with the expression, and,
therefore not protectible by the operation of merger doctrine. The second is what I view as emanating from Baker v. Selden and codified in
section 102(b)-that if a compilation or any other work defines a process, method, or art, that that expression would not be protectible because that subject matter is outside the scope of copyright protection.
The third strain of idea/expression merger seems to be creeping in,
although Feist did not rely on this explicitly in the dissent, you can see
a clear nexus. Among the ideas that were offered as an appropriate
Kregos' compilation was to say that pitching statisthe 1991
way tobydescribe
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tics are useful as predictors of outcomes of baseball games. Judge
Sweet, for his part, was unwilling to accept this as the appropriate definition of Kregos' idea because it was an old idea-that pitching statistics had been used before to predict the outcomes of baseball games.
This was old. This was not creative; therefore, he would only accept an
idea that more precisely defined and distinguished from a prior art
(again, a patent term creeping into copyright law). He would only accept an idea that was sufficiently creative to distinguish it from that
which came before. I would suggest that this was an inappropriate requirement for at least three reasons.
First, Feist provides no warrant for the imposition of a creativity
requirement on the idea of a work. Second, the kind of creativity that
Judge Sweet seemed to be imposing was at a standard higher than
Feist would require. That is, it was as if he seemed to be suggesting
something of an obviousness, or at least a novelty, standard when, in
fact, the standard in Feist is bare bones; simply,, we are looking for
some brain wave activity kind of creativity. Third, what this would introduce into copyright law are notions common to patent protection.
That is, notions that in order for the subject matter to.be copyrightable, it has to be sufficiently distinguished from that which came before
according to a standard of creativity. It is really like the patent law
standard of obviousness, and I think this is an inappropriate requirement to insert into copyright law.
In any event, what the Second Circuit did with Kregos' compilation was reverse the district court's holding of uncopyrightability and
remand for a determination of infringement. However, when remanding, the appellate court indicated that it felt that there was little likelihood that AP's form would be found to infringe, at least AP's 1986
form would be found to infringe Kregos' form because AP's 1986 form
had only used six of the nine categories that Kregos used in his copyrighted form.
Again, we find the notion that, at least with respect to the compilations of fact, the Court is going to require-for a reason I will suggest in a minute-that there be, rather than substantial similarity, almost identicality of the two compilations. The Court also brings into
reality the suggestion, or the notion, that copyright of factual compilations is thin. It is my belief that this avoids copyright infringement,
both copyrightability and the copyright infringement analysis in a way
that is undesirable. I think what is required, as I said earlier, is an
analysis of the scope of protection of the copyrighted work and an analysis of substantial similarity in the way it is conducted in most all other
works.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/15
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The last case I would like to talk about is Key Publications v.
Galore, that is, as you're probably familiar with it, the directory published primarily for the population in the Chinatown of New York
City. The selection criteria was simply to list the businesses-this is
again a yellow pages directory-that would be of interest to the Chinese population in Chinatown, selecting businesses from New York's
Chinatown, New York City's metropolitan area, and the areas of Boston and Philadelphia. There was a listing of business categories similar
to what we had in the yellow pages directory, including Bellsouth's;
that is, there were two hundred sixty categories. The directory was held
to be copyrightable both because of the subjective selection engaged in,
including the nine thousand listings, as well as the two hundred sixty
categories that the compiler of the Key directory selected.
What we have again is a finding that the work in question was
copyrightable but not infringed. The lack of infringement was due to
the fact that the accused directory included only twenty-eight of the
two hundred sixty categories and only fifteen hundred of nine thousand
listings. Again, I would submit that fifteen hundred of the nine thousand should have been, under conventional substantial similarity criteria, found sufficiently similar to the nine thousand original listings in
the Key directory to warrant a finding of infringement.
What we have again is a court requiring, or at least indicating,
that what would be required in order to find infringement of this particular compilation of facts is almost precise identicality between the
two works. Because Galore had taken only fifteen hundred of nine
thousand, that identicality did not exist, and, therefore, there was no
infringement.
As I said, I do not really know from what notion the requirement
of identicality between the two works derives, except that I can only
say that with an element of creativity inserted as a requirement of
copyrightability of a work, if you assume that in order to adequately
conduct an infringement analysis the court would be required to identify that which is copyrightable in the copyrighted work and find substantial similarity in the accused work, it just might be too difficult a
job. So in fact the default mode would be to require that the two works
be substantially identical and, therefore, avoid entirely the comparison
of the copyrighted work and the original work to whatever existed in
the accused's work.
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